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Comprehensive Protection of Genetic
Information
ONE SIZE PRIVACY OR PROPERTY MODELS MAY
NOT FIT ALL
Anya E.R. Prince†
INTRODUCTION
Genetic information is uniquely personal—it helps
define what characteristics one will develop, what traits
individuals could pass on to their offspring, and, given recent
advances in science, it increasingly helps one to learn about
medical predispositions and disease treatment options. The
medical definition of genetic information is the heritable
information coded in an individual’s genes or DNA. Given both
the personal nature of this information and the potential jackpot
of valuable medical data, individuals have an important interest
in maintaining control over their genetic information. Genetic
information, however, is simultaneously uniquely individual and
inexorably entwined with family members. Additionally, genetic
information in the aggregate provides colossal potential to
advance medical research and public health outcomes. Thus,
laws that give individuals rights over their genetic information
must balance the competing interests of the personal nature of
the information against the informational power of genetic data.
Current state laws in this arena generally grant individuals
either a property interest or a privacy interest in genetic data.
This article examines these state laws and argues that sweeping
rights to genetic information under either a property or a
privacy model are often overbroad and miss the mark,
especially given the complexities of familial relationships and
the societal implications arising out of genetic data.

† Post-doctoral Fellow, Center for Genomics and Society, UNC-Chapel Hill. I
would like to thank Tiffany Wu, Meghan Glaspy, and Rachel Cox for research
assistance; and Michael Waterstone, Shawn Kravich, and Jen Flory for feedback.
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The number of genetic tests available has ballooned to
over 2,000 tests in use in the clinical setting.1 Additionally, in
the future, more healthcare professionals will utilize wide-scale
genetic testing in clinical practice as the cost of whole genome
sequencing drops to below $1,000 per test.2 As the use of
genetic testing increases in the clinical setting, powerful
information about predispositions to disease and implications
for offspring will emerge in patient files and medical records.
While this information can greatly improve treatment options
and public health, it also implicates privacy and discrimination
concerns for the patients themselves.
Information gathered from genetic tests and family
medical history can provide a patient with vital information
about his or her propensity to develop a disease such as cancer,
diabetes, or Alzheimer’s. It can also provide information about
whether a parent is a carrier of a gene that can lead to a genetic
disorder in offspring, such as Tay-Sachs or cystic fibrosis. This
knowledge gives power to the individual to plan for the future,
establish treatment options, and practice preventive care. For
these reasons, genetic information is personal and complexly
intertwined with self-identity and family. Despite the
individuality of genetic information, the information that is
beneficial to the patient may also be desirable knowledge for
other actors—precisely because of its identifying power.
Therefore, it is essential to examine how current laws
address concerns over control of genetic information, what the
best model is for protection of individuals’ rights, and how
protections need to be improved for the future. Currently, the
premier law in the United States at the federal level regarding
genetic privacy is the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
of 2008 (GINA).3 GINA bans health insurance companies and
employers from discriminating against individuals based on
genetic information. Additionally, absent a few limited exceptions,
GINA prohibits health insurance companies and employers from
collecting the genetic information of individuals.4
While GINA has helped to alleviate some fears over
misuse of genetic information, it is relatively narrower in scope
1 Genomic
Testing, CNTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/genomics/gtesting/ (last updated Apr. 23, 2013).
2 See Erika C. Hayden & Nature News Blog, The $1,000 Human Genome: Are We
There Yet?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 10, 2012), www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=1000-genome.
3 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 2(5), 122 Stat. 881, 882-83 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
4 Id.
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than other civil rights acts because it only regulates health
insurance companies and employers. With the burgeoning use of
genetic testing and advances in understanding hereditary links
for disease, laws need to address how the broader society—from
government to educational institutions to researchers to nosy
neighbors—can use an individual’s genetic information in
contexts outside of health insurance and employment.
There has been a recent increase in genetic rights
legislation as states have begun to grapple with the question of
what rights individuals have to their genetic information.5
Most states have enacted legislation regulating third party use
of genetic information; however, the majority of these statutes
mirror GINA in that they only address health insurance
companies and employers. Fifteen states have passed broader
legislation that endows individuals with more comprehensive
control over their genetic information.6 Of these states, five
provide individuals with a property interest7 in their genetic
data and 10 grant a privacy interest.8 This article argues that
the laws are so broadly written that they may become
unworkable in practice and therefore will fail to adequately
protect individuals and their genetic interests. State legislatures
would benefit from a narrowly-tailored model law that addresses
individuals’ concerns. Additionally, states should create regulations
for areas such as newborn screening, paternity testing, and law
enforcement biobanks9 to ensure full protection for individuals in
all situations.
Part I of the article discusses the varying definitions of
genetic information and how these variations affect individual
rights over genetic information. Part II examines property
rights and privacy rights in the context of genetic information.
This part highlights the benefits and concerns of these two
models, and evaluates how the differences in their underlying
theories affect the protections and control individuals have.
5 Dan Vorhaus, Is the Genetic Rights Movement Picking up Steam?,
GENOMICS L. REP., (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/
03/16/is-the-genetic-rights-movement-picking-up-steam/.
6 Given the wide range of types of protections available, this number could
vary depending on how comprehensive legislation is viewed. This article counts those
states whose laws apply broadly across society—not those whose legislation applies to
more limited cases of insurance, employment, or family codes. See infra Parts III.B–C.
7 These states include Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana.
See infra Part III.B.
8 Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota. See infra Part III.C.
9 Law enforcement biobanks are databases housing the biological and
genetic information of arrestees and criminals. See infra Part III.D.3.
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Part III analyzes state and federal laws that have expanded
the rights individuals have over their genetic information and
examines proposed state laws that seek to do the same. The
section also comments on important exemptions that should be
written into model legislation, such as newborn screening,
paternity testing, and law enforcement biobanks. Finally, Part
IV sets forth essential provisions that model state legislation
must have in order to guarantee comprehensive genetic rights
for individuals. Accordingly, model legislation for genetic
information should include prohibitions on discrimination in
major areas of the law, criminalize surreptitious genetic
testing, create a private right of action for the unwanted
disclosure of genetic information, and require that doctors and
scientists provide subjects with an “advance research directive”
to ensure that individuals will have greater control over the
use of their genetic information in research.
I.

PIN THE TAIL ON THE DEFINITION: GENETIC
INFORMATION, GENETIC CHARACTERISTICS, AND
GENETIC MATERIAL

Due to the patchwork nature of laws in this arena, there
are varying definitions of genetic information at the state and
federal level. This article focuses upon genetic information—
intangible information that comes from DNA analysis, family
medical history, test results, and other sources. It is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss in detail the regulation of
physical genetic material, such as tissue, blood samples, or
other physical biological specimen, as this topic has been
analyzed in other academic works.10
In 2008, Congress greatly expanded protection against
genetic discrimination at the federal level by broadly defining
genetic information in GINA. Under GINA, genetic information
is

10 Other academic literature discusses individual rights in the realm of
physical genetic material—especially given a California Supreme Court ruling in Moore
v. Univ. Cal. Regents, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient has no right to
monetary shares from a commercialized cell line developed from his cells). See, e.g.,
Michael M.J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material:
Stepping Into the Future With the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 109 (1996);
Erik B. Seeney, Note, Moore 10 Years Later—Still Trying to Fill the Gap: Creating A
Personal Property Right in Genetic Material, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1131 (1998); Jeffery
Lawrence Weeden, Note, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic
Information, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 611 (2006).
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information about [an] individual’s genetic tests[,] the genetic tests
of family members of such individual, and [] the manifestation of a
disease or disorder in family members of such individual[;] . . . any
request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical
research which includes genetic services, by such individual or any
family member of such individual.11

Prior to GINA, a patchwork of federal and state laws covered
genetic discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability in
employment. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) had indicated that the ADA could be used
to bring an action for genetic discrimination, but this was never
tested in court prior to the passage of GINA.12 Additionally, in
2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order No. 13145
banning genetic discrimination against federal employees.13
The protections in the health insurance context were
even sparser than in employment. The Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) prohibits group
health insurers from using medical information in underwriting.
HIPAA, however, does not prevent health insurers from
charging a higher premium based on medical conditions. While
some states had laws that regulated the use of genetic
information in employment and health insurance, the bills
were not consistent across the country. GINA filled many gaps
in the law that existed prior to its passage.
Additionally, prior to GINA, many states had a narrow
definition of genetic information, creating a confusing
patchwork of coverage at the state level. The varying state
definitions of genetic information were mostly limited to genetic
test results or information directly gathered from
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis.
An examination of three states shows the breadth of
definitions that exist at the state level. Nebraska’s concise
definition of genetic information is “information about a gene,
gene product, or inherited characteristic derived from a genetic
test.”14 New Mexico’s slightly broader definition includes
information gathered from “genetic testing, genetic analysis, DNA
composition, participation in genetic research or use of genetic
services.”15 And finally, under Tennessee law, genetic
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2011).
Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in
Employment, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 838 (2008).
13 Exec. Order No. 13145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000).
14 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551(6)(a) (West 2007).
15 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-2D (2005).
11
12
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information must stem from genetic test results and also be
linked to genes that are associated with a specific disease
predisposition, a requirement that is not explicitly included in
all state definitions of genetics.16 The varying state definitions of
genetic testing can be confusing for many, especially individuals
who may move from one state to another and have varying
levels of protection, or for genetic researchers who work with
research subjects from multiple states. Model legislation for
this area would help to minimize confusion and increase
consistency of protection.
Increased legislation at the federal level can help to
create a trickle-down use of definitions at the state level. By
including family medical history and use of genetic services in
its definition, GINA has begun to alter society’s conception of
genetic information. For individuals with family histories of
hereditary diseases, actual legal protection is very limited if
genetic information based on test results is protected, but
information of family medical history is not. For example, an
insurance company that asks extensive questions about an
individual’s family medical history of cancer can gain vital
information about that person’s predisposition to cancer without
having a definitive genetic test result, such as a BRCA1 or
BRCA2 mutation test for breast cancer, or an HNPCC (hereditary
non-polyposis colorectal cancer) test for colon cancer.17 Therefore,
to ensure more complete protection of individual rights, the
definition of genetic information should include not just genetic
test results, but also family medical history.18
Since GINA’s passage, states have begun to use this
broader definition of genetic information. For example, California
has moved from laws regulating “genetic characteristics” to laws
regulating “genetic information.” Prior to GINA, the California
legislature had enacted a number of laws regulating the use of
genetic characteristics. California defined genetic characteristics as
Any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or
combination or alteration thereof, [or inherited characteristic that
may derive from the individual or family member], that is known to
be a cause of a disease or disorder in a person or his or her offspring,
or that is determined to be associated with a statistically increased

TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2702(2) (1997).
Sagit Ziskind, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: A New Look
at an Old Problem, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 163, 182-83 (2009).
18 Id. at 183.
16
17
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risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that is presently not
associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.19

The definition did not explicitly include family medical
history or use of genetic services. After GINA’s passage,
California enacted a law, termed Cal-GINA, which incorporated
GINA’s more expansive definition of genetic information.20 This
example illustrates what is likely to be a growing trend among
states to expand the definition of genetic information to
incorporate family medical history.
The definition of genetic information is varied,
especially at the state level. Sometimes there is variation even
within a state depending on which section of the code is defining
genetic information.21 Unless otherwise noted in this article,
genetic information will refer to the broad definition of genetic
information found in GINA that includes family medical history
and use of genetic services.
II.

LAYING THE FOUNDATION: UNDERLYING LEGAL
THEORIES FOR CURRENT STATE LEGISLATION

A.

Why Examine State and Not Federal Efforts

A comprehensive federal bill governing individual
genetic rights would be ideal in the United States—especially
because family members who share genetic information often
live across many different states. This article, however, focuses
on the state level for a number of reasons. First, given the
current political landscape, it is unlikely that Congress will pass
broad-based genetic rights legislation in the near future. After
passing healthcare reform—formally the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act—in 2010, Congress has become increasingly
polarized surrounding healthcare policy.22 Beyond healthcare,
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(i)(2) (West 2013).
S.B. 559 (Padilla), 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
21 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1379 (2009) (definition of genetic
information in health insurance to include information about genes, test results, and
family histories) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 20-448 (2009) (definition of genetic
condition as a specific chromosomal or single-gene condition in life and disability
insurances); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2012) (definition of genetics in employment
that requires the gene alteration to be specifically linked to a disease or condition) and N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2012) (definition of genetics limited to genetic testing in
insurance).
22 For example, the House of Representatives has voted to repeal healthcare
reform at least 30 times since its passage. See Tamara Keith, GOP To Make 31st
Attempt To Repeal Obamacare Act, NPR (July 09, 2012), transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/09/156474493/gop-to-make-31st-attempt-to-repealobamacare-act.
19
20
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Congress’s bill-passage rate has been at an all-time low.23
Given this climate, it is unlikely that Congress will act in the
near future to pass the overarching comprehensive legislation
that is needed to protect individuals in this arena.
In contrast, states have increasingly begun to pass
broad genetic rights legislation.24 In the future, there will likely
be continued legislative efforts across other states to fill the
gaps in genetic rights. Additionally, state legislatures will likely
look to existing laws of other states as a model for their
legislation. For this reason, it is essential to carefully examine
state efforts to date and make suggestions for future state efforts.
Finally, if and when the federal government does
address broad genetic rights, it may look to state legislation for
inspiration. “[A] ‘single courageous State’ [can] serve as a
laboratory for experiments that might lead to advances for
society as a whole.”25 State action in this area can be a catalyst
to prompt Congress to act. If enough states adopt
comprehensive genetic legislation, it could be a tipping point
that compels the federal government to adopt similarly
comprehensive legislation. Therefore, providing guidance for
current state legislatures acting in this field is beneficial for
society and individual genetic rights overall.
B.

Harms to be Avoided

State legislatures must address four harms to create an
appropriately tailored comprehensive genetic framework. First,
individuals are often worried about negative consequences that
stem from bad actors having access to genetic information—
they are scared of genetic discrimination. As mentioned, GINA
has vastly improved protections against discrimination in the
employment and health insurance context, but has left gaps in
the system for other areas such as life, long-term care, and
disability insurance; housing; and education. Second, there is
concern over possible surreptitious testing of genetic material.
For example, in a political race, a candidate’s genetic
23 Jonathan Strong & Humberto Sanchez, Congress on Pace to Be Least
Productive, ROLL CALL (Sept. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/features/Guideto-Congress_2012/guide/Congress-On-Pace-to-Be-Least-Productive-217538-1.html.
24 Jeeg, Groundswell for Genetic Privacy Building in States, COUNCIL FOR
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:07 PM), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
blog/post/groundswell-for-genetic-privacy-building-in-states.aspx; Vorhaus, supra note 5.
25 Sande L. Buhai, In the Meantime: State Protection of Disability Civil
Rights, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 (2004) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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information could be secretly tested and used against that
person to show that he or she would not be fit for the office.26
While some state laws prohibit this testing, many do not.27
Third, individuals are concerned with the unwanted disclosure
of their genetic information. This can stem from fear of
discrimination and frustrations with lack of control over
research, but there is also an inherent concern in wanting to
keep genetic information private. Finally, due to the uniquely
personal nature of genetic information, there is some desire to
not have the information used for certain purposes, such as
research that an individual does not agree with.
Current state models tend to focus on either a property or
privacy model to address individual concerns about genetic
information. The next sections will introduce the underlying legal
theories of the property and privacy models as well as introduce
implications of genetic information to the self, family, and society.
Understanding these bases will help with analysis of whether
these frameworks are addressing the harms to be avoided.
C.

Current Models of Genetic Rights

Property law grants positive ownership rights over an
item, which are firmly “enshrined in the United States
Constitution”28 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.29
Property rights are traditionally understood to encompass a
bundle of rights, which, in this case, includes the ability for
individuals to regulate the possession and transfer of their
genetic information.30 Additionally, property provides litigants
with a definitive cause of action for the taking of the
information. Therefore, states that grant a property right to
26 Robert C. Green & George J. Annas, The Genetic Privacy of Presidential
Candidates, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2192, 2192-93 (2008).
27 See Genetics & Pub. Pol’y Ctr., State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious DNA
Testing, (2009), available at www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State_law_summaries_final_all_
states.pdf (finding that 21 states and the District of Columbia do not have laws prohibiting
surreptitious testing); see also, Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 686 n.16, 687 (2011)
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2010) (prohibiting analysis or disclosure of results);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (prohibiting testing without prior consent); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
111, § 70G(c) (2008) (prohibiting health related entities from analyzing or disclosing results);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2 (2012) (prohibiting analysis and disclosure); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-l(2)-(3) (McKinney 2012) (prohibiting testing and disclosure)).
28 Weeden, supra note 10, at 650-51.
29 Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to
Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 180-81 (2004).
30 See Mary J. Hildebrand & Jacqueline Klosek, Towards a Unified Approach on
Protection of Genetic Information, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/
law-library/towards-a-unified-approach-on-protection-of-genetic-information.html.
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genetic information enable their citizens to protect against the
taking or misuse of genetic information.31
While theoretical underpinnings of property rights
began in the physical realm, over time, the model has been
expanded to include intangible concepts and ideas through
advances in patent and copyright law. Its use in regulating
nontangible data can be tricky in the area of medical records.
Even without adding a layer of genetic information, there is not
a clear ownership right over patient medical data.32 For the
most part, physical medical records are the property of the
health care provider, but the data inside is not; this is similar
to owning a book, but not owning the ideas contained inside.33
Thus, if property rights attach to genetic information the model
may look more like copyright law, rather than pure physical
ownership law. As with copyright law in books and music,
there are many more violations of property rights in these
realms of easily transferable data, than when physical
ownership is at issue.34 Therefore, property law has many of
the tools available to regulate ownership in genetic
information, although enforcement may potentially be at issue.
While property theory encompasses positive rights,
privacy theory imposes negative rights upon others. Privacy
interests developed separately from property interests, and
were intended to protect an individual’s control over personal
information and decision-making. Privacy theory emerged from
both common and constitutional law, and the constitutional
roots of privacy have been applied to medical data over time.35
The Supreme Court, for example, has held that a privacy
interest in medical information does implicate the constitutional
right to privacy, to the extent that there is one.36 Additionally,
some states have recognized a constitutional right to privacy in
their own state constitutions.37

31 Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy
Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 226 (1996); Weeden, supra
note 10, at 617.
32 Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36
AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 587 (2010).
33 Id. at 588.
34 See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, THE INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE
COST OF SOUND RECORDING PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (2007), available at
http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf.
35 Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 762-67 (2004).
36 Id. at 766.
37 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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Protecting an individual’s control over personal
information is an essential part of privacy theory.38 Many argue
that the privacy model best serves to protect this interest in
control specifically with regard to genetic information.39 “Our
genetic information is unique to us and therefore can identify us.
It has a familial component, revealing links with relatives and
something about our reproductive risks. Genetic information is
therefore deeply connected to us.”40 Thus, by protecting an
individual’s control of personal information and decisions, a
privacy model helps to protect the sanctity of the self.
D.

Balancing Competing Interests: The Benefits and
Detriments of Various Models on the Individual, Family,
and Society

Defining a personal interest in genetic information—
whether as a property right or a privacy right—can have lasting
effects on many groups. Genetic information is simultaneously
individual, familial, and societal information. Therefore, it is
important to consider how a privacy or property interest would
affect each of these levels.
1. Implications for the Self
An individual’s interest in the control over, and
confidentiality of, genetic information is grounded in protecting
the self-identity of a person. Control of genetic information goes
beyond merely protecting the secrecy of the information. It
extends to give an individual control over the manner in which
others use this information, whether others can learn this
information about them, and how others can interfere in
personal decisions.41 Personal control over genetic information
can allow an individual to preserve his or her self-identity,
while avoiding stigmatization and discrimination.
Because genetic information is inherently entwined
with an individual’s concept of self, many commentators have
noted that recognizing a property interest in parts of the body

38 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967); Charles Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83 (1968).
39 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 35, at 739-40.
40 Id. at 739.
41 Id. at 739-40.
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falls at odds with morality.42 Therefore, they argue that privacy
rights are preferred over property interests because such rights
allow control over information without commodifying body
parts and “disaggregat[ing] the parts from the self.”43 Under a
property model, genetic information is a commodity rather than
something in which we have a personal interest. While property
interests connote a certain control over genetic information, they
also can have a negative effect. Privacy, on the other hand, does
not treat the person as its “constituent parts,” but rather
“understands it holistically,” which better protects our integrity.44
Courts that have addressed property rights in an
individual’s body parts have expressed “distaste for the
possibility of treating human body parts as a form of
property.”45 The legal system does not promote commodification
of body parts. For example, it is illegal to buy or sell organs,
which instead must be donated. Some argue that bestowing
these property rights on individuals will turn bodies into
commodities,46 allowing exploitation of the needy, who will sell
their cells even when it may harm their health.47 However,
criticisms against the commodification of body parts are mostly
limited to physical tissue samples and organs, not personal
data. Some have argued that the worry over commodification of
the self is inapposite when only genetic information, not
physical material, is at issue.48 But the concerns of
disaggregating the self into pieces, rather than the whole, can
still come into play when information about the self is
introduced. As Professor Jessica Roberts has written,
Allocating jobs, educations, or other social goods and privileges based
on genetic traits fails to acknowledge that, while genetic information
might reveal some aspects of a person’s identity—such as elements
of her appearance, her health risks, or even her talents and

42 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for
Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their
Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 277 (2004).
43 Suter, supra note 35, at 737.
44 Id. at 763.
45 See Robin Feldman, Whose Body is it Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange
Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2011).
46 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 35, at 746-47.
47 See Feldman, supra note 45, at 1384; Hildebrand & Klosek, supra note 30.
48 See Comparative Law—Genetic Privacy—Icelandic Supreme Court Holds
that Inclusion of An Individual’s Genetic Information in a National Database Infringes
on the Privacy Interests of His Child.—Guðmundsdóttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003 (Nov.
27, 2003), 118 HARV. L. REV. 810, 815-16 (2004) [hereinafter Comparative Law].
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tendencies—it is incapable of capturing the essence of that person in
her entirety.49

Proponents of maintaining privacy rights, therefore, argue that
privacy law is more suitable because it recognizes the “integrity
and continuity of the self,”50 and is specifically made to protect
individuals and their identities.51
Use of an individual’s genetic information also has
moral implications where the use of the information can
undermine the specific values and beliefs of the individual.52
“For instance, individuals may oppose research on the genetics
of certain behavioral or other traits, like intelligence or sexual
orientation.”53 In addition, some people may believe that
genetic information should not be patented. Without personal
rights over their genetic information, they lack any control over
what their DNA is used for, which can conflict with their
beliefs.54 This right to decide what one’s body and its parts are
used for is a fundamental right that therefore deserves the
utmost protection—protection that goes beyond monetary
compensation and requires informed consent from the individual.
This informed consent plays a vital role in protecting individual
interests in genetic information and respecting human dignity.55
Genetic information often implicates a person’s sense of
personal identity. A privacy model, which stops others from
accessing this information, may help an individual maintain
his or her sense of self. Individuals may lose their sense of
security or autonomy if others in society can access information
that is so complexly entwined with personal identity.
2. Effect on the Family
Beyond self, genetic information is unique in its ability
to provide enlightening information about an individual’s
family.56 There is an increasing movement to expand the
definition of genetic information from individual genetic test
49 Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 612 (2011).
50 See Suter, supra note 35, at 763.
51 See id.
52 Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
119, 125 (2009).
53 Id. at 125-26.
54 Id. at 126.
55 Id.
56 Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 810.
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results to include family medical history and the genetic test
results of a family member.57 Under the expanded definition, a
mother’s genetic information is also her children’s genetic
information. But assigning personal control of genetic information
can create complications for family members who may want
access to that information or to ban its dissemination.58 As society
embraces the inclusion of family medical history in genetic
information, and states change their legal definitions of the
term, regulation over control of genetic information must take
family member rights into account.
Assigning a property interest in genetic data may create
a complicated realm of dual ownership of certain medical
information. Property law envisages the possibility of joint
ownership in goods, real estate, copyright, and other realms of
possession. For example, easements or licenses provide certain
individuals with the right to use another’s private property.59
Thus, some analysts argue that a property framework is an
effective model for handling joint genetic information.60 But joint
ownership may create difficulties for family members. For
example, if there is a dispute about what to do with a jointly
owned piece of property, such as a house, the common legal
recourse is to sell the property and then split the profits among all
the joint owners. This, of course, is not a practical framework for
genetic information. Ownership in genetic data can more
appropriately be analogized to joint licensing under copyright
law. However, this is not an ideal framework for genetic
information among family members either. Under joint
authorship, for example, an author can often give license to
third parties to use the work.
This does not necessarily play out smoothly in a
situation regarding genetic information. Imagine, for example,
a politician with a family history of Alzheimer’s running for
office. A newspaper columnist wants to write an exposé about
the politician, but the Alzheimer’s information is only known
within the family. Under joint ownership, a brother could sell
his portion of the genetic information to the author for
publication without permission from the politician. The
politician would have no recourse, even though she is arguably
the target for the information and deeply connected to the
See supra Part I.B.
Weeden, supra note 10, at 653.
59 Comparative Law, supra note 48 at 816.
60 Id. at 815 (discussing the multiple stakeholders involved in privacy
interests of genetic information and the complexities that the law must address).
57
58

2013]

PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION

189

genetic information of her brother. Therefore, while a property
model envisions joint ownership possibilities, it does not
necessarily address all concerns of individuals because it does
not protect the privacy of the data or who the data is given to.
Other analysts have suggested that control of genetic
information in the medical field should be seen as a “joint
account model” rather than as an individualized notion.61
Under this model, genetic information of one individual would
be made available to all family members unless there are
compelling reasons not to do so.62 While this may seem at odds
with the individualized privacy rights model entrenched in the
system, this concept is enshrined in the mainstay of United
States health privacy law: the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. Although it is a widely unacknowledged
provision, the Preamble to the privacy rule of HIPAA notes that
medical information can be disclosed without violating HIPAA,
even for the treatment of another individual—not the individual
whose medical information is being disclosed.63 The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services notes that this can
be helpful when a family member is deceased and another
family member could benefit from medical information for their
own treatment.64 This exception within HIPAA could have huge
implications in the field of genetic privacy and shows that the
federal government already predicts a framework where the
health privacy of an individual is not absolute when it comes to
the familial unit.
Courts have also grappled with joint privacy interests
among family members. The cases have varied in addressing
issues of privacy among individuals; however a joint right of
privacy is not an absolutely foreign concept to United States
courts. In Vescovo v. New Way Enters, a daughter sued for
invasion of privacy because her mother had placed a lewd
classified advertisement in the paper. The court held that this
invaded the daughter’s right to privacy when men, in response
to the ad, came to the house she and her mother shared.65 In
61 See Weeden, supra note 10, at 653, (citing Who Should Genetic Information
Belong To?, HEALTH & MED. WK. (Aug. 9, 2004)).
62 See Weeden, supra note 10, at n.181.
63 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.500 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre02.htm.
64 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Health Information Privacy:
Frequently Asked Questions (2006), www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/right_to_access_
medical_records/222.html.
65 Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Ct. App. 1976);
see also Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 815-16.
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other circumstances, however, United States courts have
generally not “impose[d] a duty of confidentiality [in]
interpersonal relationships.”66
In the context of genetics, there has been some
movement by courts to require healthcare professionals to
disclose medical information in the context of hereditary
disease. For example, in Safer v. The Estate of Pack, a father
was treated by a doctor for colon polyps and eventually passed
away due to colon cancer when the patient’s daughter, the
plaintiff, was ten.67 Thirty-six years later, the daughter
experienced abdominal pain and was eventually diagnosed with
multiple polyposis. She sued her father’s doctor for failure to
warn her of the hereditary nature of the illness.68 The Superior
Court of New Jersey held that a physician has a duty to warn a
patient’s immediate family members who are at risk of
avoidable harm from genetically transmissible conditions. This
case shows that courts could move toward a model where
certain third parties have a duty to warn and breach individual
privacy rights where a disease has known hereditary causes.
If we return to the example of the politician above,
under a privacy rights model we see that there are difficulties
as well. The newspaper columnist would have a harder time
arguing that the brother got informed consent to disclose the
information because it violates the politician’s privacy rights
and its value is tied to the politician. Thus, a privacy model
may better protect the interests of an individual and allow him
or her to avoid stigmatization and exploitation.
The line becomes more blurred in other circumstances.
For example, imagine a situation where a doctor speaks to a
local Boy Scout group, with permission and informed consent of
a patient, about the patient’s family history of Alzheimer’s
disease. The doctor’s talk is meant to teach the group about
heredity diseases. But if the patient’s cousin is connected to the
group, then the doctor has just shared the cousin’s information as
well. This situation would also pose problems under a property
rights model because the patient could give the doctor permission
to use the data in the same manner as under a privacy model.

66 Trevor Woodage, Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy Protection
Because of the Inability to Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Information by Relatives, 95
MINN. L. REV. 682, 707 (2010) (comparing a court decision allowing publication of
private details about a relationship to publication of genetic information).
67 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
68 Id.
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3. Consequences for Society
In the aggregate, genetic information also has
implications for society as a whole. Researchers use the
combined genetic information of many individuals to study the
genetic mutations associated with certain diseases or traits.
Without vital access to the genetic information of many
individuals, researchers will not be able to properly compute
trends and connections between proteins, DNA, and diseases. Due
to this global benefit, some argue that genetic information should
be owned by society as a whole.69 Proponents of this theory note
that the public should have access to genetic information because
public money funded the Human Genome Project that created
value in genetic information in the first place.70 While it is very
difficult to simultaneously balance privacy or property interests
for both individuals and society as a whole,71 it is important to
consider how genetic research would be implicated by having a
personal property interest, a personal privacy interest, or an
altogether different interest in genetic information.
There is an overarching policy argument in genetic
rights legislation regarding the need to encourage individual
participation in genetic research. For example, Congress passed
GINA to ease individual fear of genetic discrimination and
therefore promote participation in genetic testing and research.72
Similarly, property interests in genetic materials can incentivize
patient participation because patients can bargain for
pecuniary reimbursement.73
Conversely, the current property rights regime may
discourage individual participation in research because
researchers are not required to consider a donor’s rights when
using his or her cells.74 A substantial amount of tissue used in
biotechnology research has been obtained without paying
compensation, and even without informing the cell donors that
their cells can potentially generate economic returns.75
Furthermore, if individuals are given property rights in their
69 See Ilise L. Feitshans, Spider Silk Jeans or Spider Silk Genes? The Future
of Genetic Testing in the Workplace, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2001).
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 See, e.g., David Resnick, GINA—A Big Step Toward Personalized Medicine,
BOS. BUS. J. (Aug. 21, 2008, 6:04 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/masshigh-tech/2008/08/gina--a-big-step-toward-personalized-medicine.html?page=all.
73 Lin, supra note 10, at 229.
74 See Gitter, supra note 42, at 280.
75 See id. at 270-71 (citing Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue,
86 VA. L. REV. 163, 182 (2000)).
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cells, researchers may be hampered if they are required to follow
the chain of title in each piece of genetic material they obtain
and if they are fearful of liability for mistakes.76
This potential negative effect on research may be
overstated. Some authors argue that recognizing a property
interest in an individual’s genetic materials may, in fact, have a
positive effect on research by providing individuals with an
incentive to donate information.77 Generally, when individuals
are not compensated or are not given a small payment for a
good that they provide, they will be less willing to provide that
good, whether or not providing it places a high burden on them,
or even any burden at all.
Despite the argument that the possibility for monetary
compensation will encourage participation in genetic research,
this may not hold true for both genetic material and genetic
information. Some have argued that while a property interest
in physical genetic material can promote research, a property
interest in genetic information that stems from this material
can actually hinder research because researchers would not be
able to fully utilize the information in public datasets.78
Overall, both a privacy model and a property model
could stymie essential public health research about the genetic
links to disease. If research is hindered, this could slow the
public health benefits of genomic advances.
E.

Effect on Enforcement and Front-End Protections

Choosing either a property or a privacy model for
protecting genetic information changes how an individual can
enforce violations of those rights. Laws that merely establish a
privacy right against the release of genetic information to
employers and insurance companies arguably provide less
protection than laws that give individuals a property right in
their genetic information.79 In states that grant a privacy
interest, people “have some rights in relation to the cells of
their body . . . . [T]hose rights, however, generally are grounded
in notions of the fiduciary duty that a doctor owes to a patient
and are frequently centered on the doctor’s obligation to obtain

See id., at 280.
See Hildebrand & Klosek, supra note 30.
78 Rodwin, supra note 32. Note, however, that Rodwin is not speaking of
individual ownership of their genetic information, but of private database ownership.
79 See Weeden, supra note 10, at 628.
76
77
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informed consent.”80 Additionally, because property rights are
grounded in the Constitution and privacy rights are grounded
in common law torts, some argue that this puts privacy rights
on “weak ground.”81 Unfortunately, an action against a
physician for violation of his or her fiduciary duty may not be a
sufficient deterrent for doctors to protect their patients’ cells
and the genetic information contained within.
These proponents argue that a property right is
stronger because of its Constitutional basis and that patients
therefore may be able to better enforce any potential violations.
Property interests may be beneficial in cases like Moore v. U.C.
Regents of the University of California, where a patient brought
suit against his doctor to recover money the doctor earned
using the patient’s genetic material, but did not share any
profits with the patient.82 However, the privacy framework may
be more adept at preventing some of the unwanted harms from
the outset. In the case of genetic information, much of the
concern stems from preventing the information from being
released in the first place. Privacy is a stronger preventive
framework, but is not as strong in enforcement. Once an
individual’s genetic information has been leaked, compensation
for a violation of privacy rights is likely insufficient, especially
if the individual loses his or her job or is unable to obtain
health insurance. Therefore, in order to best protect individual
concerns, it is important to consider not only which framework
is the strongest for enforcement, but also which framework is
best for prevention. This is especially true because many
individuals, unfortunately, do not have the resources to file a
civil court case even if their rights were violated under either a
property or privacy model.
III.

BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE
EFFORTS TO DATE

A.

Need for Broad Coverage

While there has been some movement at the state level
to legislate regarding rights to genetic information, most of
these efforts have been narrowly focused. For the most part,
See Feldman, supra note 45, at 1380.
Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 817.
82 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). In Moore, a doctor turned the cell line of a patient
undergoing treatment for hairy cell leukemia into a commercialized line—without the
patient receiving monetary benefit. Id.
80
81
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states have genetic privacy legislation related to health
insurance and employment—just as GINA only covers these
realms at the federal level. These laws, therefore, leave a gap
for entities outside of the health insurance and employment
arena that might be interested in obtaining an individual’s
genetic information.83 While health insurance and employment
are certainly important areas, genetic progress implicates
broader concerns such as education, banks, government
entities, biobanks, restaurants, and more.84 For example, in
2012 a student at Jordan Middle School in Palo Alto, California
was required to transfer schools because he had the genetic
mutation for cystic fibrosis.85 The student was not diagnosed with
the disease, but given his genetic make-up, the school felt that he
may be a health risk to two other students who were diagnosed
with cystic fibrosis.86 Although he was allowed to return to school
after an appeal by his parents, this example shows the potential
for use of genetic information in realms outside of insurance and
employment. To date, however, most states have limited genetic
information legislation to only those two arenas. Forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have genetic information
legislation that pertains to employment or insurances only, while
three states—North Dakota, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania—
have no regulations at all.87
Nineteen states have genetic information statutes that
are broader than just health insurance and employment and
extend to cover life, long-term care, or disability insurances.88
Two states have limited scope statutes regulating areas beyond
only employment and insurance. Arkansas, for example, has the
Genetic Research Studies Nondisclosure Act, which prohibits
disclosure of tissue samples in genetics research only if the
samples have been made anonymous or if that patient has given
informed consent.89 This law does not explicitly address whether
the data that stems from the tissue or blood samples are similarly
83 Ram, supra note 52, at 122; Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Genetic Information
and Third Party Access to Information: New Jersey’s Pioneering Legislation As a Model for
Federal Privacy Protection of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1998).
84 Roberts, supra note 49, at 648.
85 Colman Chadam, California Boy Ordered to Transfer Schools for Carrying
Cystic Fibrosis Gene, Goes Back to Class, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:58 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/08/colman-chadam-california-_n_2092816.html.
86 Id.
87 See infra Appendix, Table 1.
88 See infra Appendix, Table 1.
89 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-35-103 (2001); Note Arkansas is not included in the
table as a state with regulation since only the physical specimen, not the DNA or
information is regulated, see infra Appendix, Table 1.
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protected. Similarly, Texas state law covers employment and
insurance, but also forbids genetic discrimination in licensing.90
Several states, however, have broad reaching statutes
regarding genetic rights. The next section will examine these
statutes and examine which choose a property interest and
which opt for a privacy interest.
B.

Broad Coverage through a Property Interest

Five states—Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and
Florida—have passed legislation that provides individuals with
a property interest in their genetic information, although other
states have proposed legislation in this area.91 Overall, the
legislation among these states follows similar patterns. First,
these statutes tend to cover genetic materials or limited genetic
information. If they cover genetic information at all, it is the
information that derives specifically from a genetic test, not
broad genetic information such as family history.92 Therefore,
most of these states do not raise questions of joint ownership of
genetic information, assuming they are read narrowly to only
pertain to the genetic test results of the individual being tested.
Second, these statutes provide exemptions for specific areas of
genetic information collection.
In Alaska, “a DNA sample and the results of a DNA
analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of
the person sampled or analyzed.”93 The law requires written,
informed consent for the collection, analysis, retention, or
disclosure of information, with exceptions for law enforcement
biobanks, paternity, newborn screenings, and emergency
medical treatment.94
Colorado’s provisions are quite sweeping and declare that
“genetic information is the unique property of the individual to
whom the information pertains,” although there are exceptions to
the confidentiality requirements of the information for use in law
enforcement, research (if the information is anonymous),
paternity suits, and public health.95
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.051 (West 2003).
See, e.g., Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and
States: A Look at South Dakota and Around the U.S., GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 20,
2012), www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-statesa-look-at-south-dakota-and-around-the-u-s/; See infra Appendix, Table 1.
92 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1) (2010).
93 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a) (2004).
94 Id.
95 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a).
90
91
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Georgia’s law also uses Colorado’s “unique property”
language, with exceptions for law enforcement and anonymous
research.96 The law is housed in the insurance section of the
Georgia code and certain insurances, such as life, disability,
and Medicare supplemental plans, are exempt from the genetic
testing chapter.97 Therefore, it is unlikely that Georgia’s law
would apply outside the insurance context as a result of the
law’s location in the code.
Louisiana’s legislation in this area is also housed under
the insurance code and states that “[a]n insured’s or enrollee’s
genetic information is the property of the insured or enrollee.”98
Under the law, authorization is required for anyone else to
retain genetic information, unless it is for a criminal
investigation or to determine paternity.99 The statute defines
genetic information broadly to include genetic test results of
both the individual and family members, as well as manifested
diseases of family members.100 Due to the sweeping definition of
genetic information under Louisiana law, this is one state where
seemingly innocuous and routine events could violate the law. For
example, the legislation states that “no person shall retain an
insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information without first obtaining
authorization from the insured, enrollee, or their representative”
and person is defined to “include a family, corporation, partnership,
association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision
or agency, and any other legal or commercial entity.”101 Under the
broadest reading of this, a healthcare professional could not store
information about a mother in her medical records without getting
authorization from her children and other family members or
without violating the family member’s property interest. This
expansive reading is unlikely given that the rules are contained
in the insurance code and speak directly to the genetic
information of the insured or enrollee. Thus, although “person”
is defined very broadly, Louisiana’s law most likely is much
narrower and only covers the insurance context. As a result,
the strong and important property rights regarding individuals’
genetic information in Louisiana are not as powerful as needed
because genetic rights implicate other areas beyond insurance.

96
97
98
99
100
101

GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2009).
Id. § 33-54-7.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2011).
Id.
Id. § 22:1023 (A)(8)
Id. §§ 22:1023 (A)(13), (E).
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The legislation passed in Florida states that “results of
such DNA analysis . . . are the exclusive property of the person
tested” and must remain confidential without the consent of
the person tested except in the case of law enforcement
biobanks and paternity testing.102 Florida’s law is the only one
of the five statutes that has been specifically tested in a court,
although the ruling is limited as it was not in the highest court
in the state. In Doe v. Suntrust Bank, a plaintiff brought suit to
determine the identity of a deceased man’s children in order to
properly distribute the man’s trust among his descendants.103
Doe, the decedent, had two known children, and two alleged
children. The trial court ordered the known children of Doe to
submit to DNA testing to assist in the determination of the
putative children’s parentage.104 The legitimate children relied
upon Florida’s code to argue that they could not be compelled to
provide genetic data to the court without informed consent.105
There is an exception in the Florida statute for paternity, but
this exception only applies to the testing of “the child, mother,
and alleged fathers,” not to alleged siblings.106 In its opinion on
the motion to quash decision, the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida held that
the primary purpose of the statute is to protect individuals who
undergo DNA analysis by requiring informed consent before the
analysis is performed, by providing confidentiality for the results,
including exempting the results from disclosure as a public record,
by providing control over how the results are disclosed, and by
requiring notification that the analysis was performed and how it
was used.107

Nevertheless, the court also noted that the exceptions listed in
the statute are not the only times that a court can order an
individual to submit to a genetic test.108
The dissent in Suntrust argues that the court’s opinion
devalues the privacy interest in one’s DNA composition and
undermines the legislative intent in § 760.40. “The majority,
under the guise of discovery rules, would allow circuit courts to
order DNA testing if the testing is arguably relevant to the
pending matter, thereby ignoring the legislative determination
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2009).
Doe v. Suntrust Bank, 32 So. 3d 133, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), appeal
denied, 46 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2010).
104 Id. at 135.
105 Id. at 137.
106 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.12(1) (West 2001).
107 Suntrust, 32 So. 3d at 138.
108 Id.
102
103
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protecting an individual’s privacy rights to his or her own
DNA.”109 This difference between the majority and dissenting
opinions illustrates not just the difficulty of writing
comprehensive legislation surrounding genetic rights, but also the
difficulties in court enforcement.
Although Suntrust raises questions about whether DNA
testing falls within one of the exceptions to genetic testing, it did
not specifically address the children’s property right in the genetic
information. Thus, across all states with a genetic property model,
this right remains untested in the courts.
C.

Broad Coverage through a Privacy Interest

There is more variation among states that focus upon a
privacy interest than those that focus on a property model.110
As mentioned above, one reason for this is that some of the
privacy laws tend to be narrow and focus only on employment
and insurance,111 but even among broader state laws, there is
greater variation. Ten states have generally broad privacybased laws regarding individual rights to genetic information:
New Jersey, Delaware, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and South
Dakota.112 These state laws cover broader privacy rights of
individuals and tend to establish rules for the collection,
retention, and disclosure of genetic information. These laws
generally include informed consent provisions, although the
nature of the informed consent is altered depending on the state.
As with the property states, these states also incorporate areas of
exceptions into the law.
New Jersey’s law—the Genetic Privacy Act—had one of
the most interesting journeys through the legislative process.
The bill, as originally passed by the state legislature, created a
property right in genetic information; however Governor
Whitman vetoed the bill because “the creation of a new
statutory property right could lead to a proliferation of
litigation in New Jersey—litigation that could have a chilling
Id. at 143.
In the analysis of state laws, statutes that applied to limited
circumstances, such as in the family code for paternity testing, or to employment or
insurance only were not included. This section focuses on some of the states whose
statutes may have broader implications.
111 See supra Part III.A.
112 See infra Appendix, Table 1; Nebraska is discussed below, but is not
included in the total count because the provision is limited to physicians and therefore
does not count as comprehensive.
109
110
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effect on scientific research.”113 The final bill signed into law
was narrower, but is still considered one of the earliest broad
genetic information laws to be passed.114 Under the codified
Genetic Privacy Act, genetic information cannot be collected,
retained, or disclosed without authorization from the individual,
although there are exceptions for anonymous research and other
categories.115 The law has been heralded as a model for other
states, and most other state laws focusing on genetic privacy in
broader categories have followed New Jersey’s example to
regulate genetic information at multiple stages—collection,
retention, and disclosure.
Delaware prohibits, with some exceptions, obtaining
genetic information from an individual without obtaining
informed consent.116 Delaware’s definition of genetic information
does not explicitly include family medical history, but it does not
explicitly exclude that information either.117 Therefore, a broad
reading of the law would require informed consent to gather
family history; however, a strict reading of the law only requires
informed consent when performing a genetic test. Delaware’s
statute is also notable because it requires genetic samples to be
destroyed promptly after use unless retention is necessary for
criminal proceedings, authorized by court order, authorized by the
individual, or anonymized for use in research.118
Minnesota, Illinois, and Iowa are similar in that genetic
information may only be collected, used, and stored in the
manner for which an individual has given written informed
consent.119 Additionally, in Minnesota, written informed consent
regarding dissemination of genetic information is only valid for a
maximum of one year, but a lesser period can be specified in the
consent agreement.120 Therefore, after the period of informed
consent had expired, healthcare professionals, researchers, and
other actors would have to obtain informed consent again to
disseminate genetic information to a third party.
New Hampshire also requires written informed consent to
perform a genetic test, except for a few limited situations, including
113 Gov. Christine Todd Whitman, Senate Comm. Substitute for S.B. Nos. 695
and 854, 3 (Sept. 19, 1996), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/9697/Bills/s1000/695_v1.pdf.
114 See Stepanuk, supra note 83, at 1116.
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45 (West 2009).
116 DEL. CODE ANN. 16 § 1202(a) (2012).
117 Id. § 1201(b).
118 Id. § 1203(b).
119 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386(3) (West 2012); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/15
(1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (West 2010).
120 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386(3)(4)(ii).
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paternity, newborn testing, and criminal investigations.121 The
information cannot be distributed to anybody not approved of in
writing, although there is an exception for disclosure by a physician
within the medical practice or hospital.122
New Mexico, like New Hampshire, requires informed
and written consent to obtain and retain genetic information,
with exceptions for the original medical records of patients.123
New Mexico’s law also has a provision similar to Delaware’s
that genetic information must be destroyed upon request of the
individual, with some exceptions.124
New York law is similar with regard to the requirement
for informed consent for collection, retention, and disclosure;
however, there are some unique provisions under New York
law.125 For example, one provision states that
no person who lawfully possesses information derived from a genetic
test on a biological sample from an individual shall incorporate such
information into the records of a non-consenting individual who may
be genetically related to the tested individual; nor shall any
inferences be drawn, used, or communicated regarding the possible
genetic status of the non-consenting individual.126

However, this provision essentially terminates at death,
because genetic testing may be performed on deceased
individuals if informed consent is obtained from next-of-kin.127
These provisions have immense implications for how family
members can use their own genetic information—family
medical history—in their personal healthcare.
Oregon has a provision similar to New York when the
genetic information of a deceased person is in question. Oregon
law requires informed consent to obtain, retain, and disclose
genetic information.128 There is, however, an exception to the
rule for obtaining genetic information when it is “for the purpose
of furnishing genetic information relating to a decedent for
medical diagnosis of blood relatives of the decedent.”129 Unlike
New York’s version of this provision, informed consent of the
next-of-kin is not required in Oregon.

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2 (2012).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(III) (2008).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(A) (West 1998).
Id. § 24-21-5(B).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2012).
Id. § 79-l (3)(b).
Id. § 79-l (11).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(1) (West 2009).
Id. § 192.531(1)(f).
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Finally, South Dakota and Nebraska have requirements
to obtain informed consent prior to genetic testing.130 Nebraska
limits the requirement to physicians, but has an interesting
provision whereby properly obtained informed consent is a bar
on a civil suit against the physician for failure to inform.131
Overall, the states that follow a privacy model focus on
individual control of genetic information, specifically regarding
collection, storage, and dissemination of genetic information.
Most of these state laws apply broadly across populations, but
each includes exceptions for various reasons.
D.

Common Exceptions to the Rule

Across the states, exceptions to genetics rights
legislation continue to emerge—both in a privacy and a
property model. It is important to examine these exceptions to
see why these areas should potentially fall under different
rules. Each of these exceptions are covered in full articles
themselves.132 This article argues that given the complexity of
each of these areas, they should be exempted from this model
state legislation. Given their unshakable implications for
individual rights and privacy, states should address each of
these in turn to truly establish comprehensive genetic rights for
citizens. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to
recommend model laws for these areas. Instead, this section
gives a brief primer on the issues to highlight the complexities
and illustrate why the exceptions exist.
1. Newborn Screenings
Most babies in hospitals are required to go through this
common routine: “a small prick to the heel and a few drops of
130 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-22 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551
(West 2007).
131 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551(4).
132 See generally Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s
Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767 (1999) (examining state
practices for law enforcement DNA databanks and suggesting policy changes to protect
genetic information); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (discussing the
inability for information in databases to be completely anonymous and suggesting
possible responses); Jaclyn S. D’Arminio, Note, “The Life of the Flesh Is in the Blood”:
State Storage and Usage of Baby’s Blood Sample, 18 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 753
(2012) (discussing the ethical, legal, and social implications of storing newborn
screening samples); Dee O’Neil Andrews, Comment, DNA and Dads: Considerations for
Louisiana in Using DNA Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 38 LOY. L. REV. 425
(Summer 1992) (examining the use of DNA testing in paternity suits).
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blood collected on a piece of paper.”133 The tests done on this
blood sample are part of one of the nationwide Newborn
Screening (NBS) programs. Each state tests newborns for a
number of genetic conditions and disorders.134 The number and
type of tests vary among the states. One example of a common
newborn screening measure is the test for phenylketonuria (PKU).
This test checks whether a baby can process phenylalanine, an
amino acid found naturally in many foods containing protein. If it
cannot, the phenylalanine will build up in the body and can cause
brain damage. If caught early, PKU can be treated through
simple dietary changes.135 In this way, NBS programs help detect
otherwise undiagnosed genetic disorders, but they also do much
more. In many cases, there is a likelihood that a baby’s blood
sample, called a bloodspot, will sit in a biobank where scientific
researchers may be granted access to these samples.136
One of the salient problems with NBS programs is their
lack of regulations. Most NBS programs do not have a
formalized consent process; only Maryland, Wyoming, and the
District of Columbia require informed consent from the
parents.137 Most of the other states use an opt-out form of
consent, which “assumes that unless the parents specifically ask
for the bloodspot to be destroyed, they have consented to the
continued storage and presumed use of those bloodspots in
research studies approved by the state.”138 This can be
problematic because parents, who would not have consented to
storage of their child’s bloodspot, may not be aware that they
need opt out. “The mandatory data collection under opt-out
programs and potential use of newborn samples in later
research implicate a myriad of legal and ethical issues,
particularly for programs with no requirements for any
parental education regarding the screening program.”139
Some argue that states should have the burden of
ensuring that parents have given the state consent to have

D’Arminio, supra note 132, at 753.
NAT’L NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RES. CENT., NAT’L NEWBORN
SCREENING STATUS REPORT (Jan. 6, 2013), available at http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/
sites/genes-r-us/files/nbsdisorders.pdf.
135 Newborn Screening, CNTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May
13, 2013) www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/pediatricgenetics/newborn_screening.html.
136 D’Arminio, supra note 132, at 753-54.
137 Id. at 754 n.7.
138 Id. at 759.
139 Rachel L. Schweers, Note, Newborn Screening Programs: How Do We Best
Protect Privacy Rights While Ensuring Optimal Newborn Health?, 61 DEPAUL L. REV.
869, 870 (2012) (footnote omitted).
133
134
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their child’s information.140 States argue that consent is not
required because NBS involves a public health issue, but when
the state’s interest in identifying the disease no longer exists—
either because the child does not have a disease or because the
child has been treated—the state’s only interest with the DNA is
for research purposes.141 Opt-in programs can be beneficial
because they respect parents’ and patients’ right to privacy and
their choice in medical treatment and care, require physicians to
educate their patients about the available options, and may result
in greater research use of the samples currently available.142
Statutory guidelines are necessary to safeguard the
privacy rights of newborns. One possible consequence of not
protecting newborns’ privacy and not requiring informed
consent is that parents may opt out of screening their children.
“This prevents their children from [receiving] the diagnosis and
lifesaving treatment they may need, and the state’s public health
interest is no longer being met.”143 Given the complications of
balancing the privacy interests of newborns and families with
the public interest in decreasing the number of children
suffering or dying from genetic conditions such as PKU, this
area should be addressed with specific legislation.
2. Law Enforcement Biobanks
Another common exception in genetics rights legislation
relates to the question: to what extent should DNA sampling be
used by law enforcement? Genetic analysis can be a powerful
tool for law enforcement and criminal courts because DNA
profiling serves as a more reliable form of identification than
fingerprinting and matches individuals to hair, skin cells, or
other cells containing DNA at the scene of a crime. As such,
many law enforcement agencies at the state and federal levels
have begun to collect DNA samples in biobanks. This allows
investigators to cross check evidence from a wide variety of
crimes with DNA samples within the biobank. Due to the
ability for these biobanks to be such powerful tools for law
enforcement, the laws governing DNA sampling in the criminal
context has been rapidly expanding. For example, Virginia
initially required only certain sex offenders and certain violent

140
141
142
143

D’Arminio, supra note 132, at 759.
Id. at 760.
Schweers, supra note 139, at 872-73 & n.23.
D’Arminio, supra note 132, at 760.
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felons to provide DNA samples for the state’s DNA biobank.144 But
within a year, the law was expanded so that all newly-convicted
felons must provide DNA samples for the state DNA biobank and
that all felons in Virginia prisons must provide DNA samples
upon their release.145 Other states that require DNA samples from
all convicted felons, violent or non-violent, include Alabama,
New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming.146
Felons are not the only ones at risk of having their DNA
samples collected. By simply being arrested, an individual may
be required to provide his or her DNA sample. In California,
individuals arrested on felony charges are required to provide a
DNA sample for analysis and inclusion in a biobank.147 DNA
databases not only reveal genetic information about the
individual who has DNA on file, but also information about his
or her close relatives.148 One of the most prominent examples of
this is the case of the “Grim Sleeper” in California. In 2010, the
police were able to arrest a man linked to 10 murders in the Los
Angeles area—dating as far back as 1985—through a familial
DNA search.149 This was possible because law enforcement
officers had arrested the Grim Sleeper’s son and collected his
DNA sample. Standard tests revealed that his DNA partially
matched DNA evidence from the unsolved murders. The partial
match indicated that a family member would be the culprit.150
This example highlights one of the most controversial aspects
of California’s—and other jurisdictions’—biobanking DNA
collected from arrestees, not just convicted individuals. In this
case, the young man may not have even committed the crime
he was arrested for, but simply by being arrested he
unwittingly gave the police evidence of his father’s crime. Some
may argue that this also shows the benefit of the law
enforcement biobanks because 10 unsolved murders were
resolved and future murders were potentially thwarted.
Nevertheless, policymakers should take the privacy concerns of
arrestees and their family members into consideration because
of these situations.
Hibbert, supra note 132, at 774.
Id.
146 ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-6 (West 2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-403 (2010).
147 CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2008).
148 Hibbert, supra note 132, at 782.
149 Joel Rubin, Grim Sleeper: How LAPD Followed the DNA to an Arrest, L.A.
TIMES (July 8, 2010, 11:11 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/07/howdna-led-to-the-arrest-of-the-grim-sleeper.html.
150 See id.
144
145
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At the federal level, law enforcement is allowed to
collect DNA from arrestees without a warrant and place this
information in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).151 If
cleared of the crime, arrestees can seek expungement; however,
the federal government is not required to grant such a
request.152 This begs the question: why should individuals who
were wrongly arrested have their DNA profile in the federal
database, and why is it their responsibility to have the
information removed?
Some argue that DNA sampling is the next natural step
to fingerprinting, but DNA sampling is very different from
fingerprinting. Making DNA sampling a part of the same
routine as fingerprinting is problematic. Courts have upheld
arrestee DNA sampling because they reason that law
enforcement has the right to be certain of the identity of the
arrestee.153 But this reasoning “is undermined by the fact that
there has [been no evidence] that an individual’s fingerprints
can be altered,” whereas “DNA evidence can be successfully
fabricated.”154 More importantly, fingerprinting is an ideal way
to determine who a person is because fingerprints do not offer
any other personal information.155 On the other hand, DNA
samples contain all sorts of revealing information beyond that
of the individual’s identity. Although some argue that the DNA
that is collected for this purpose is only “junk” DNA and does
not reveal medical information of individuals, this idea has
been challenged.156
Given the complexities of rules surrounding collection of
genetic information for law enforcement purposes, it is
important to address these concerns separately from a general
genetics model. States must consider from whom DNA can be
collected, how and for how long it should be stored, and what
purposes the information in the biobanks can be used for.

151 Ashley Eiler, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee
DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1201, 1202 (2011).
152 Id.
153 Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to
Routine Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 484 (2010).
154 Id. at 484-85.
155 Id. at 490-91.
156 Cory Doctorow, Court to Hear Argument on the Privacy Implications of
‘junk’ DNA Databases, BOING BOING (Sept. 19, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://boingboing.net/
2012/09/19/court-to-hear-argument-on-the.html.
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3. Paternity
Many states have excluded paternity testing from
statutes regarding genetic testing.157 In fact, many of the family
law statutes in states have specific rules over the usage of
genetic testing in the context of paternity testing.158 The use of
genetic testing to determine paternity is generally less
controversial than its use in law enforcement biobanks and
newborn screening—likely for two main reasons. First,
scientific testing to determine paternity has been occurring since
the 1930s, beginning with ABO blood type testing.159 Second,
given the wide availability of direct-to-consumer paternity
testing,160 a person can get tested for paternity without concerns
about inappropriate storage and use of genetic material attached
to his or her name. There are other public policy concerns with
wide availability of direct-to-consumer genetic testing;161 however,
the ability to send anonymous samples often eases concerns about
privacy, thus making paternity testing less controversial. Despite
the minimal controversy in this area, full comprehensive
legislation of genetics rights needs to ensure that there is proper
regulation of genetic information use in paternity testing that
meets societal goals while maintaining privacy.
4. Anonymous Data
The final common exception in state statutes for
individual genetic rights is for anonymous data. In an effort to
protect individuals’ privacy, researchers have tried to
“anonymize” data. Anonymization is a technique researchers
use to protect the privacy of individuals in large databases by
deleting or changing personal, identifying information.162 “Data
may be anonymized by not collecting or completely removing
identifiers, by aggregating data into groups and ranges and not
reporting individuals’ identities, or by micro-aggregating the

157 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1023(D)(2) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45(a)(2) (West 2009).
158 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.12 (West 2010).
159 See O’Neil Andrews, supra note 132, at 428.
160 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Gniady, Note, Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing: Protecting the Consumer Without Quashing a Medical Revolution, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2429, 2444 (2008).
161 Stuart Hogarth et al., The Current Landscape for Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues, 9 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM.
GENETICS 161, 165, 168 (2008).
162 Ohm, supra note 132, at 1701.
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data into pseudocases representative of the real population.”163
However, some policy analysts argue that this is not a
sufficient protection because it is not difficult to “reidentify” or
“deanonymize” individuals. The copious amount of information
contained within DNA makes identification possible.164 A
second strategy is to keep research participant information
confidential by keeping identifying information separate from
other research data and assigning a meaningless code to the
research data. There would remain a “key” that could link
information back to the identity of the participant, but only
certain researchers would have access to the key.165
Neither method—anonymization nor confidentiality—
can completely guarantee privacy.166 Two of the most striking
examples of this come from a recent study where researchers
identified men in an anonymous gene registry based on publically
available information,167 and a computer science professor
identifying the “anonymous” medical records of the governor of
Massachusetts through publically available information.168
Additionally, even if individual anonymity is somewhat protected,
biobank data can identify members of discrete populations.169 This
can be extremely problematic when the collection of data deals
with highly sensitive information, such as HIV infection, mental
illness, or alcoholism.170
Many states that have laws granting a privacy or
property interest in genetic information specifically exempt
anonymous data from the protections. But given the inability to
make genetic information completely anonymous in research,
states should not include anonymous data as an exception.171
163 ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY, AHLA-PAPERS
P05049804 (1998).
164 Gabrielle Kohlmeier, The Risky Business of Lifestyle Genetic Testing:
Protecting Against Harmful Disclosure of Genetic Information, 11 UCLA J. L. & TECH.
1, 44 (2007).
165 Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of LargeScale Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANNU. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENET. 343, 349 (2007).
166 Id.; see also Woodage, supra note 66, at 703-04.
167 See Dan Vergano, Gene Detectives ID ‘Anonymous’ Men in Registry, USA
TODAY (Jan. 17, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/home/2013/01/17/
personal-genome-male-identified/1842175/.
168 Greely, supra note 165, at 352.
169 Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451,
520 (1995).
170 Id. at 521.
171 While many states specifically exempt anonymous data from genetic rights
statutes, some states have taken steps to try to ensure the privacy rights of individuals
of anonymized data. For example, in Oregon, the Oregon Privacy Act requires someone
to notify patients that their tissue may be used for anonymous genetic research. See
Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context: Implications for the
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Thus, genetic rights protections for genetic information should
include both general genetic information and anonymized
genetic information. The next section outlines the ideal model
for this legislation.
IV.

DETERMINING THE IDEAL: ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF
THE STATE MODEL

A.

Dangers of Statutes that are Overbroad

Although a broad individual interest in genetic
information is an important right—especially given the
personal and familial nature of genetic information—many of
the current laws end up being so broad as to be unworkable in
some circumstances. There are two main concerns with
overbroad laws in this area which may inhibit free speech and
chill potential research. First, if not carefully written,
legislation can unintentionally result in making certain
common activities illegal. For example, states that have made
disclosure of genetic test results illegal without written
informed consent from the individual potentially make some
journalism unlawful. In 2008, several news outlets published
stories about actress Christina Applegate’s cancer diagnosis
and her decision to get a double mastectomy given that she
carries the BRCA-1 mutation and had a higher-risk of
developing cancer again in the future.172 These news outlets
would have violated multiple state laws assuming that they did
not get informed consent from Ms. Applegate that met the legal
requirements in each state—even though Ms. Applegate is
open about her BRCA status and has started the Right Action
for Women foundation, an organization that provides high-risk
women with access to breast screenings.173
As states begin to incorporate a broader definition of
genetic information into their laws, the concern over disclosure
of information, leading to the breadth of laws in this area, will
be somewhat exacerbated. For example, in California, the
Genetic Information Privacy Act has been introduced in the

Social Meaning of Genetic Information and Individual Identity, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
423, 444 (2003).
172 See, e.g., Liz Szabo, Applegate and Other High-risk Women Act Fast
Against Cancer, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2008, 10:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
health/2008-08-19-applegate-mastectomies_N.htm.
173 In fact, this article may violate a number of state laws by disclosing her
genetic status, helping to show how truly broad these restrictions can be.
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state senate.174 This proposed legislation includes an expanded
definition of genetic information and requires written informed
consent to obtain, analyze, or disclose genetic information.175
Thus, under this law, for example, writing about how President
Obama’s mother had ovarian cancer could be a violation. At the
broadest level, telling a coworker that a friend’s father has high
blood pressure would be a violation of the law unless written
informed consent was first obtained from the friend and his
father. Therefore, under both examples of broad interpretations
of the law, there may be violations that were not meant to be
legislated by the states. Yet these laws still provide important
and essential protections for individuals in a growing area of
privacy: The solution would not be simply to not pass these
laws, but to carefully word and tailor protections necessary to
avoid these expansive violations.
Second, there is a concern that overbroad laws will
hinder scientific innovation and research. In both the property
and privacy models, there is potential to obstruct important
public health research if scientists have to follow a chain of
title for genetic information or have to get informed consent for
each new research protocol. Therefore, because genetic
information in the aggregate can have immense societal and
public health implications, it is important to strongly consider
the implications on research when establishing the laws.
B.

Addressing the Concerns

Current state law genetic information privacy and
property models tend to be overbroad in their protections.
Nevertheless, these frameworks often fail to address some issues
related to family disclosure of genetic information, implicate
additional concerns about commodification of the self, and
hinder research participation.176 Therefore, a different model
designed to address these additional concerns is necessary.
As mentioned above, there are four main concerns for
individuals in the realm of genetic rights: fear of
discrimination, surreptitious genetic testing, unwanted
disclosure of genetic information, and control over how
personal information is used in research.

174
175
176

S.B. 1267 (Padilla), 2011–2012 Reg. Session (Cal. 2012).
Id.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
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1. Fear of Discrimination: Need for Comprehensive
Ban on Discrimination
Fear of discrimination is a major concern for individuals
seeking genetic testing. For many, the interest in genetic
privacy stems from concerns that genetic test results will be
misused.177 While GINA has expanded protections against
genetic discrimination at the federal level, it only extends that
protection in the context of employment and health insurance.
Thus, individuals are not protected from discrimination at the
federal level in other areas—most notably in the context of life,
long-term care, and disability insurances.178 While the majority
of literature has focused on gaps in federal law regarding life,
long-term care, and disability insurances,179 there is also the
potential for misuse of genetic information in other realms,
such as education, licensing, mortgage lending, and public
accommodations. Due to the broad range of areas in which
genetic information can be inappropriately used, a
comprehensive law protecting genetic information must include
broad anti-discrimination protections.
Additionally, these laws must completely ban the use of
genetic information in these realms, rather than simply
regulate the use of genetic testing. Currently, some states have
laws that protect against the use of genetic information in life,
long-term care, and disability insurance, but these laws
generally regulate how genetic information is collected and
used. For example, in Maryland, a long-term care insurer can
only use genetic information in coverage or premium decisions
if it is based on actuarial justification.180 This is a common state
trend to ban only “unfair” discrimination that is not based on
actuarial principles. This does not, however, provide sufficient
protection for individuals who have genetic predispositions to
certain conditions or chronic diseases because it can effectively
bar them from getting access to these insurances—having a
predisposition to a disease will likely have strong actuarial
justification for increased premium rates or denials. Therefore,
anti-discrimination laws must be expanded to ban the use of
genetic information in a variety of areas at the state level.
Roberts, supra note 49, 603.
Susannah Baruch, Your Genes Aren’t Covered for That: One Year Later, Gaps
in Genetic Discrimination Legislation Reveal the Challenges Ahead, SCI. PROGRESS BLOG,
(June 29, 2009), http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/06/gina-challenges/.
179 See id.
180 MD CODE ANN., INS., § 18-120 (LexisNexis 2008); MD CODE ANN., INS.,
§ 27-208 (LexisNexis 2005).
177
178
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California is one of the first states to provide strong,
comprehensive protections against genetic discrimination in a
broad range of arenas. In 2011, California passed “Cal-GINA,”
which protects individuals against genetic discrimination in
many of these areas.181 As Senator Padilla, the author of the
bill noted, “SB 559 [(Cal-GINA)] will include genetic information
as a prohibited basis for discrimination in the areas of housing,
employment, education, public accommodations, health
insurance coverage, life insurance coverage, mortgage lending,
and elections.”182 Cal-GINA amends California’s civil rights
statute, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, to make genetic
information a protected class. Unruh is very broad and applies
to “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”183
Comprehensive legislation at the federal level or in other states
must also be this broad in order to truly protect individuals
from having their genetic information misused.
2. Control of Genetic Material: Banning Surreptitious
Testing
Another concern for individuals seeking genetic testing
revolves around unauthorized access to their genetic
information. Due to the personal nature and potential misuse
of genetic information, individuals often have a strong interest
in keeping their genetic information private. Two major
concerns stemming from this are fears that somebody may
gather genetic information without an individual’s knowledge
and concern about inappropriate disclosure of that information.
These fears can be addressed with properly tailored legislation
regarding surreptitious genetic testing and disclosure. As
mentioned above, many of the current laws attempting to protect
genetic privacy in this area are too broad.184 Therefore, the laws
must be more narrowly tailored to avoid unintended
consequences. This does not mean that the laws should lose their
comprehensive protections—a properly tailored law can give
broad protections without making innocuous behavior illegal.
The first step toward narrowly tailoring genetic privacy
legislation is to explicitly make surreptitious genetic testing
S.B. 559 (Padilla), 2011–2012 Reg. Session (Cal. 2011).
Press Release, Senator Alex Padilla, Governor Signs Padilla Bill to Prevent
Genetic Discrimination, (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://sd20.senate.ca.gov/news/
2011-09-07-governor-signs-padilla-bill-prevent-genetic-discrimination.
183 Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2013).
184 See supra Part IV.A.
181
182
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illegal. With the ever-increasing number of direct-to-consumer
testing sites available, it is becoming much easier for somebody
to collect another individual’s genetic material and send it to a
lab for analysis.185 Testable genetic material can be pulled from
strands of hair, discarded cups, or used cigarettes.186 This
practice of surreptitiously testing another person’s DNA
without their knowledge is not illegal in many states. In a recent
survey, the Genetics and Public Policy Center found that only 10
states restrict surreptitious collection for both health and nonhealth related purposes.187 Other states regulate specific areas,
such as health-related testing, paternity testing, and
employment, but 21 states have no laws relating to
surreptitious testing.188 Even among those states with laws
regarding genetic testing without an individual’s knowledge,
the laws may not provide strong enough protections to cover all
circumstances.189
Accordingly, a comprehensive model of genetic rights
must prohibit intentionally taking or collecting an individual’s
genetic material, without written informed consent, for the
purpose of analyzing, disseminating, or disclosing genetic
information. This portion of the model state law should
explicitly deal with the collection of genetic material—not the
collection of genetic information overall. As the definition of
genetic information expands to include family medical history
and use of genetic services, it is essential to clarify that this
broad definition does not apply to the surreptitious testing
portion of a model law. It is not practical to require written,
informed consent each time somebody asks about a family
member’s condition or about a test result.
Commentators
have
suggested
criminalizing
surreptitious genetic testing.190 A prospective criminal law
should have three elements. First, the law must be broad
enough to encompass collection from discarded items, such as
cigarette butts, as well as direct collection of DNA samples
185 Sara Katsanis & Gail Javitt, Surreptitious DNA Testing, GENETICS &
PUBLIC POL’Y CENTER (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/
Surreptitious_testing_issue_brief.pdf.
186 Id.
187 State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious DNA Testing, GENETICS & PUB.
POL’Y CENTER (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State_law_
summaries_final_all_states.pdf.
188 Id.
189 See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Stalking and Voyeurism: A New Challenge
to Privacy, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 539, 560-61 (2009).
190 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 689 (2011).
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through saliva, blood, or tissue. Therefore, the language of the
law must be broad enough to include a ban on collecting
discarded genetic material, as well as taking genetic material
directly from a person. For example, New York state law bans
genetic testing on a sample “taken” from an individual without
informed consent.191 But this prohibition may not encompass all
surreptitious testing because it may not apply to “abandoned”
items.192 Second, if genetic material is collected from an
individual, written, informed consent should be required. While
some have argued that there should be exceptions for law
enforcement and healthcare professionals, this article argues
that there should only be an exception for law enforcement.193
Especially given the concerns about research, discussed below,
there are compelling reasons why patients should have to give
written, informed consent when undergoing genetic testing in
the healthcare setting.194 Finally, the law must only ban
collection of genetic information if the collectors intend to
analyze or disseminate the information. This helps to tailor the
law so as not to make it overly broad.195
In some circumstances, intent can be difficult to prove.
While protective laws are important, not every person has
equal access to the judicial system and not every violation of
the law is easy or possible to prove. Therefore, state laws can
add additional protections that will help to thwart
surreptitious testing from occurring in the first place. For
example, genetic testing facilities should be prohibited from
extracting genetic information from anything other than a
blood sample, buccal swab, saliva test, or other generally
accepted laboratory practice.196 This regulation would prohibit
testing to be done off of discarded samples, such as drinking
glasses or cigarette butts—thus making surreptitious testing
more difficult to complete. As in the case of a criminal law
against surreptitious testing, there should be an exception for
law enforcement purposes. However, this is one area where
paternity testing should not be exempt from the state
comprehensive law. Surreptitious testing for parentage
determinations is one of the main areas of concern for policy
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 79-l(2)(a) (McKinney 2009).
See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 189, at 560-61.
193 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 190, at 691-92.
194 See infra Part IV.B.4.
195 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 190, at 690 (noting that intent is essential to
avoid criminalizing the purchase of celebrity mementos that may have DNA on them
when the individual has no intent to analyze the DNA).
196 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 189, at 575.
191
192
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analysts in this arena.197 There is concern that women will test
unknowing men to determine if they are the fathers of children,
or men will take genetic material from children to determine
whether they are their fathers. The rights of men and children
to not be surreptitiously tested should remain intact. This is an
area, however, where it may be appropriate to create an
exception for court-ordered testing.
3. Maintenance of Privacy: Avoiding Disclosure of
Genetic Information
A ban on surreptitious genetic testing alone will not
provide adequate protection for the privacy rights of
individuals. In addition to banning secret testing, states also
need to legislate regarding disclosure of genetic information.
The statute should prohibit disclosure of genetic information with
the intent to harm the individual whose information was disclosed,
or with the intent to give personal gain to the discloser. This
requirement is especially important when genetic information
includes not only test results, but an individual’s family history. A
ban on surreptitious testing may help to avoid covert analysis of
genetic material, but this does not preclude an individual from
collecting and disclosing sensitive family history. Because family
medical history has the potential to reveal information about an
individual’s propensity to a disease, this information must be
regulated in order to fully protect an individual.
Legislating against disclosure of genetic information has
a strong basis in common law and some state tort doctrines.
For example, in many states, the common law right to privacy
includes both the rights to be free from intrusion upon an
individual’s seclusion or solitude, and from public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts.198 But common law itself does not
provide sufficient enough protection in this area because it is
not clear that courts will apply these principles to disclosure of
genetic information.199 For purposes of comprehensive genetic
rights legislation, the public disclosure of private facts should
be banned. Further, the elements of this violation should be
altered from the general common law definition in order to be
effectively protective.

See, e.g., Katsanis & Javitt, supra note 185.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977); see also Rothstein,
supra note 189 (discussing how states have adopted pieces of the restatement).
199 Rothstein, supra note 189, at 548-53.
197
198
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First, at common law in many states, the disclosure of
private facts must be embarrassing in nature.200 There are
pieces of genetic information, however, that may be positive or
neutral, but that an individual still maintains a desire to keep
private.201 Additionally, due to the familial nature of genetic
information, a neutral disclosure about one person may
implicate family members. For example, if an individual tests
negative for Huntington’s Disease, this is not “embarrassing”
for the individual, but indicates that other family members did
have the disease—hence the need to be tested. Therefore,
legislation in this area should make clear that disclosure also
means any private genetic information that the individual does
not want disclosed—not only those that a reasonable person
would find embarrassing.
Second, under the tort of disclosure of private facts, the
revelation must be given to the public. Therefore, a line must
be drawn that clarifies what constitutes public disclosure. If an
individual gossips to two other coworkers about the genetic
information of their boss, does this rise to the level of public
disclosure? If a public blog that only has 10 followers publishes
the family history of a local political candidate, is this sufficient to
count as public disclosure? Courts have varied in interpretations
of how many people it takes to constitute public disclosure.202 In
order to create the most comprehensive protections at the state
level, legislatures should define public disclosure broadly to
include giving information to a small number of individuals.
Third, states must decide whether and how they will
define the “newsworthy” or “noteworthy” exception to the
public disclosure tort. Often, an individual is allowed to
disclose private facts if it is of legitimate concern to the
public.203 This means that it will be more difficult for a public
figure to win under the disclosure law than a private
individual. This exception is enshrined in First Amendment
jurisprudence, and may therefore be difficult to alter. It is
important to note in the law—to the extent possible—where
this line may be drawn. An exception for newsworthy or
noteworthy disclosure may leave a gap in protection for public
individuals whose genetic information is disclosed—such as a
Id. at 548.
Id. at 551-52.
202 See id. (discussing the court split between whether disclosure to a small
number of coworkers rises to the level of public disclosure).
203 Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and
Public People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295, 311 (2008).
200
201
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candidate’s genetic information.204 Nonetheless, this model
framework fixes two current problems in the realm of public
figures. First, because it bans surreptitious testing, it makes it
more difficult to legally gather information from the outset.
Second, this law corrects the concerns about criminalizing some
journalism about individuals such as Christina Applegate by
tailoring the anti-disclosure laws more narrowly.
These broad changes in the tort elements should be
coupled with an additional intent element. While intent can be
difficult to prove in some circumstances, this addition creates
an appropriate balance between allowing the free-flow of
information in journalism, research, healthcare, and daily life,
while protecting privacy interests of individuals. Therefore, the
statutory ban on disclosure in a state comprehensive genetics
bill should ban the disclosure of genetic information with the
intent to harm the individual or family member or with the intent
to obtain personal gain for the discloser. Including an intent
requirement would avoid banning most daily conversations, but
would make illegal the disclosure of genetic information to harm
an individual, create sensational news, or give one individual’s
private information simply to harm a family member. This ban on
disclosure of all genetic information—including family history—
coupled with the ban on surreptitious testing can offer
comprehensive privacy of genetic information without creating
overbroad privacy or property rights.
The addition of the intent requirement will make some
public disclosure of private facts not actionable—even some
disclosures that may be offensive or upsetting to the individual.
For example, the Boy Scout example205 would most likely not be
actionable under this model. Still, this solution creates a more
desirable balance than the current state laws in this area that
are overbroad and make illegal many innocuous conversations.
Laws that protect every possible unwanted disclosure of
genetic information will be overbroad and significantly hinder
important daily activities, journalism, and research. The
balance drawn between individual protection and efficiency is
best when state laws ban surreptitious testing and
simultaneously prohibit certain intentional disclosure of
genetic information

204
205

Green & Annas, supra note 26.
See supra Part II.D.2.
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4. Control over Research: Providing Meaningful
Informed Consent through an “Advance Research
Directive”
The final area of concern for many individuals in
genetics rights is research data. Many individuals have their
genetic material and genetic information stored in biobanks
where researchers can collect data for research projects. These
individuals may not even be aware that their genetic
information is stored. In other situations, individuals may have
given permission for their tissue sample or information to be used
for one type of research, but are unaware that their data has been
stored for other research in the future. Many biobanks store data
in a deidentified or anonymous manner; but, as discussed above,
there is no such thing as truly “anonymous” data in this arena.206
Due to the uniquely personal nature of genetic information,
individuals may not want their information used for research that
they find offensive.207 There are a variety of harms that can come
from unwanted participation in genetic research, such as
possible reidentification of “anonymous” data, objectionable
uses, and harms to discrete groups.208
Once an individual’s data is housed in a biobank, it is
rare that a person will be contacted again to give informed
consent for subsequent research. However, “information or
material collected for one purpose may have tremendous value
for additional purposes, particularly if analyzed by techniques
not previously available.”209 Indeed, restricting the use of genetic
material to single tests would be impractical and greatly hinder
the benefits and ease of use of biobanks.210 In some cases, an
individual has signed loose informed consent documents for the
initial research that they enrolled in, but these documents do
not adequately give information regarding subsequent research
or the possibility of reidentification of anonymous data.211 In order
to give individuals comprehensive rights to their genetic
information, a state law must provide some amount of individual
See supra Part III.D.4.
See supra Part II.B.
208 Mark Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in
Research? 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 5-7 (2010).
209 Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory
Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health
Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737, 740 (1999).
210 Greely, supra note 165, at 357.
211 E.W. Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1786-92 (1995).
206
207
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control over research without hindering the research and public
health benefits of population databases and biobanks.
Giving an individual a meaningful informed consent
opportunity when genetic information is first gathered for
research is an essential step toward individual control. Note,
however, that this will not solve the dilemma of how to regulate the
large amount of genetic information already housed in biobanks
across the country. In the past, scholars in this field have suggested
mechanisms such as a newsletter or specialized review board to
keep individuals informed of research, especially in cases of
controversial research.212 These systems can help to ensure
continued individual involvement in research, but this article will
focus on informed consent at the initial collection point.
Informed consent documents are difficult to create in a
manner that will truly inform patients of future research and
future uses,213 but, when properly conducted, informed consent
ensures that individuals understand their rights regarding their
genetic information. Studies have found that individuals
generally view societal benefits as a positive reason to enroll in
research and discrimination or abuse of information as
deterrents.214 Thus, effective informed consent may encourage
further participation in research. However, meaningful informed
consent is difficult to give in this arena.
If the creation of these database resources is to be practicable, the
materials and information will need to be available to investigate
many diseases and many target genes. But that kind of broad
availability will make it impossible for researchers to give the kind
of full information about the potential risks and benefits of specific
research that existing law seems to require for informed consent.215

Therefore, states may need to alter the way in which informed
consent is provided for research to ensure a balance between
individual protection and research benefits.
Most importantly, informed consent needs to include
information, not just about risks and benefits of current
research, but also about potential future research. Laws
regarding informed consent should apply to both research and
clinical settings—both arenas may lead to future research

Greely, supra note 165, at 358.
Erika Check Hayden, A Broken Contract, 486 NAT. 312, 312 (2012).
214 See, e.g., Henderson et al., Great Expectations: Views of Genetic Research
Participants Regarding Current and Future Genetic Studies, 10 GENETICS MED. 193 (2008).
215 Greely, supra note 209, at 741.
212
213
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using initial sample collection.216 In a 1999 report, the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) recommended that
informed consent for research should be obtained separately from
informed consent for clinical procedures.217 This article does not
contradict that recommendation, as the recommendation speaks
to when informed consent should be gathered, not the fact that
informed consent should be collected. Comprehensive state laws
should require informed consent for all initial contexts in which
an individual’s genetic material and information will be used
for research—whether stemming from clinical care or from
direct enrollment in research.
It is impractical, for both individuals and researchers, to
require new informed consent for every subsequent research
protocol performed with an individual’s genetic information.218
But current informed consent forms do not adequately inform
individuals of future research and potential risks and benefits
of that research.219 Therefore, a balance in the middle of these
extremes must be created. One option would be to allow
individuals to complete an informed consent document that acts
as an “advance healthcare directive” for the use of genetic
material—an “advance research directive.”
In most states, advance healthcare directives have
multiple sections for an individual to fill out and make decisions
about their health decisions in case of incapacity. For example,
the California advance healthcare directive includes parts that
relate to: (1) naming a “power of attorney for healthcare,” (2)
establishing individual wishes for treatment, (3) delineating
guidelines for organ donation, (4) designating a primary care
physician, and (5) signing the form.220 Informed consent
documentation should be established to follow a similar model.
In particular, there should be five main sections of
informed consent in an advance research directive: (1)
delineating options for future research, (2) clarifying views on
“anonymous” research, (3) listing family members, (4) designating
a primary care physician, and (5) signing the form.

216 While newborn screening is often an exception to state laws in this area,
informed consent in newborn screening has been increasingly in the spotlight in recent
years. States considering legislation in this area may need to specifically address
newborn screening informed consent. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 213, at 312.
217 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 64 (1999).
218 Greely, supra note 165, at 357.
219 Hayden, supra note 213, at 312.
220 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (2000).
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a. Options for Future Research
The first section of informed consent should give
individuals the space to delineate what type of research they
consent to for future use of their genetic information. The
NBAC suggested this concept in its 1999 report.221 For samples
collected in the future, the NBAC recommended that “consent
forms be developed to provide potential subjects with a
sufficient number of options to help them understand clearly
the nature of the decision they are about to make.”222 The
report lists six sample options:
[1] refusing use of their biological materials in research,
[2] permitting only unidentified or unlinked use of their biological
materials in research,
[3] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for
one particular study only, with no further contact permitted to ask
for permission to do further studies,
[4] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for
one particular study only, with further contact permitted to ask for
permission to do further studies,
[5] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for
any study relating to the condition for which the sample was
originally collected, with further contact allowed to seek permission
for other types of studies, or
[6] permitting coded use of their biological materials for any kind of
future study.223

Another option would be to allow individuals to opt-in, or
out, of research for a particular type of disease or condition. For
example, an individual could state that his or her genetic
information could be used for any research, except for research
regarding Alzheimer’s disease. In that case, there would be the
potential that an individual’s instructions do not clearly line up
with research resulting in confusion for researchers as to whether
consent was truly given. However, this potential lack of clarity
also exists in the context of advance healthcare directives. No
advanced method is truly perfect, but allowing for patient choice
is important. Under this system researchers would at least have
some guidance and individuals would have more control.
NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 217, at 65.
Id.
223 Id. Two commissioners argued that the last two options should not be
made available to the public. Id.
221
222
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Additionally, this potential lack of clarity can be mitigated by
providing some guidance to individuals. For example, some
advance healthcare directives specifically give options for feeding
tubes or palliative care, but also provide a free-form section for
individuals to write more specific instructions. Similarly,
informed consent for research could list common diseases,
conditions, or behaviors that may be studied—especially
controversial potential research areas such as behavioral genetics
or the genetics of homosexuality—and also leave space for
individuals to write in more specific instructions.
Allowing individuals this control over their genetic
information will make use of biobanks more difficult for
researchers. The researchers must create a system to code for
individual’s desires and only use the genetic information in each
project of individuals who have consented to that type of research.
This creates work to create such a system, and the possibility that
fewer genetic samples will be available for studies. This is still
preferable to those current state laws that have the potential to
make research nearly impossible by requiring new informed
consent documentation for each use of genetic information. Given
the uniquely personal aspect of genetic information, this system
creates a fair balance between individual control and research
functionality. Additionally, researchers have begun to use models
like these for returning research results to participants and
therefore, may be able to be modified for use at the front end
research participation.
b. Anonymity
As mentioned above, there is almost no way to make
genetic data both useful and truly anonymous.224 Therefore,
informed consent documents must explain this to individuals.
The procedures for how patient information will be made as
anonymous as possible should be delineated. In this section,
individuals will sign that they understand the limitations of
the anonymity of data. If they do not want research done where
anonymity cannot be guaranteed, they should be able to note
this in the first section above.

224

See supra Part III.D.4.
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c. Family Members
Due to the familial nature of genetic information,
individuals should have the option of designating a family
member or family members to contact in the event that there
are research results that could be returned, but the individual
is no longer accessible.225 This would be similar to appointing a
power of attorney for healthcare decisions, but would appoint a
family designee to obtain relevant research findings.
d. Primary Care Physician
Individuals should also have the opportunity to provide
the name of a primary care physician from whom to receive
research results. As more biobanks are determining how to
best return research results to their subjects, some individuals
may decide that they do not wish to hear this information
directly from the researcher. In some circumstances, individuals
may prefer to have their doctor share this information with
them so that they have the opportunity to ask questions and to
determine next steps for clinical care. Therefore, the advance
research directive should include a space to provide contact
information for a primary care physician.
Other laws in the genetic arena have acknowledged the
advantages of having a doctor, rather than another party,
disseminate the information to the originator of genetic
information. For example, in Minnesota, a life insurance
company can notify an individual of genetic test results by
releasing information to either the individual or their designated
physician.226 “If the individual tested has not given written
consent authorizing a physician to receive the test results, the
individual must be urged, at the time that the individual is
informed of the genetic test result described in this subdivision,
to contact a genetic counselor or other health care
professional.”227 New Jersey, New York, Maine, and Texas all
have similar provisions in their codes.228
225 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss returning research results
and implications of duty to warn family members, but the creation of a comprehensive
informed consent document provides an opportunity to address some of these concerns
at the front end.
226 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139(6) (2012).
227 Id.
228 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-43 (West 2009); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615(e) (McKinney
2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 24-A § 2159-C(3)(B) (2009); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2, § 21.404 (West 2003).
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Allowing individuals to include a physician on their
advance research directive may increase participation in research
because it may help to alleviate individual fears regarding
knowledge of predispositions. Speaking to a trusted physician
about a test result, rather than receiving information through a
researcher or computer print-out, may be more palatable to
some individuals.
CONCLUSION
As the use of genetic testing rises, many states are
beginning to pass legislation aimed at filling the gaps in GINA
and providing comprehensive genetic rights to individuals.
Comprehensive genetic rights are essential to encourage the use
of testing, ensure participation in research, and strengthen
individual rights in a deeply personal and familial realm.
However, many state efforts to date provide overbroad property
or privacy rights in genetic information and are not sufficiently
tailored to create truly comprehensive rights. An article in the
Genomics Law Report summarizes the trend in its review of a
proposed South Dakota bill.
In under 200 words, the South Dakota bill, if passed, would (1) grant
property rights to individuals in their DNA samples and genetic
information, (2) prohibit surreptitious testing, (3) call into question
many forensic and law enforcement uses of DNA, (4) eliminate
newborn blood spot screening without explicit consent and (5) impose
broadly worded informed consent requirements on all collections and
uses of individual genetic data.229

Genetic rights are too complicated to fully protect with a
law containing fewer than 200 words. The growing trend
among states to make overbroad laws in this arena jeopardizes
individual rights because it waters down the law, makes
innocuous behavior illegal, and makes it harder to pass corrective
legislation the second time around.
In order to provide comprehensive genetic rights for
individuals, states should make broad laws that are specifically
tailored to address the four major concerns of individuals in the
genetic arena—fear of discrimination, surreptitious genetic
testing, unwanted disclosure of genetic information, and
control over how personal information is used in research. To
do this, states should expand anti-discrimination laws to ban
the use of genetic information in all businesses and
229

Wagner & Vorhaus, supra note 91.

224

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1

government practices, prohibit surreptitious genetic testing,
forbid intentional disclosure of genetic test results for personal
gain or to harm an individual or family member, and create
meaningful informed consent in research by creating an
advance research directive for individuals whose genetic
information will be used in research. Only with tailored
components of a broad genetic rights bill will individuals truly
be given comprehensive rights over their genetic information.
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APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION REGARDING
GENETIC INFORMATION
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i ALA. CODE § 27-53-2 (1997) (regulating only genetic tests for a predisposition
to cancer in health insurance).
ii ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.480 (2009) (requiring health insurance companies to
comply with GINA); ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a) (2004) (creating a property interest).
iii ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (2009) (regulating health, life, long-term care, and
disability insurance); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2010) (regulating employment).
iv ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-403 (West 2001) (regulating employment); Genetic
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-320 (West 2001).
v CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(i)(2) (West 2013).
vi COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1) (West 2010).
vii CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816 (West 2012) (regulating insurance);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2009) (regulating employment).
viii DEL. CODE ANN. 16 § 1202(a) (West 2012) (establishing a privacy interest);
DEL. CODE ANN. 18 § 2317 (1998) (regulating insurance); DEL. CODE ANN. 19 § 711
(West 2013) (regulating employment).
ix D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (3)(e) (West 2012) (regulating employment).
x FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6561
(West 2011).
xi GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2013) (creating a property interest); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-54-3 (2013) (regulating insurance).
xii HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-118 (LexisNexis 2003) (one of multiple statutes
regulating genetic information in health insurances); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1
(LexisNexis 2012) (regulating employment).
xiii IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-8301 – 8304 (2006) (regulating employment); Id.
§ 41-1313 (2006) (regulating health and disability insurances).
xiv 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/1 – /35 (1998).
xv IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-5 (West 2013).
xvi IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (West 2010).
xvii KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259 (West 2010) (regulating health, disability, and longterm care insurances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(9) (West 2012) (regulating employment).
xviii KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085(2) and (3) (West 2013) (regulating health
and disability insurances).
xix LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2011) (regulating health insurance and
establishing a property interest); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:368 (2010) (regulating employment).
xx ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-C (2013) (regulating health, life, long-term
care, disability, and dental insurances); Id. § 19302 (2013) (regulating employment).
xxi MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18-120 (LexisNexis 2008) (regulating long-term care
insurance); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (2001) (regulating health insurance); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV. § 20-606 (LexisNexis 2009).
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xxii MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2013) (regulating employment);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 108H (West 2011) (regulating health insurance); id.
§ 108I (West 2011) (regulating disability and long-term care insurances); id. § 120E
(West 2011) (regulating life insurance).
xxiii MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202 (West 2013) (regulating employment);
Id. § 500.3407b (regulating health insurance).
xxiv MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)(4)(ii) (2012) (establishing a privacy interest); id.
§ 72A.139 (2012) (regulating health and life insurance); id. § 181.974 (2012) (regulating
employment).
xxv MO. ANN. STAT. § 375.1303 (2012) (regulating health insurance); Id. § 375.1306
(regulating employment).
xxvi MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-903 (2013) (regulating health insurance); id.
§ 33-18-206 (regulating life, long-term care, and disability insurance under the more
narrow definition of genetic condition).
xxvii NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7,100 (2012) (regulating health insurance); id
§ 48-236 (regulating employment); id. § 71-551(6)(a) (granting a limited privacy right
only in the context of physicians).
xxviii NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 695C.207 (LexisNexis 2012) (regulating health
insurance); id. § 613.345 (regulating employment); id. § 629.151 (requiring informed
consent in the healing arts).
xxix N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1 to :4 (2013).
xxx N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-43 to -48 (West 2009) (establishing a privacy
interest); id. § 17B:26-3.2 (one of several provisions regulating genetic information in
health insurance); id. § 17B:30-12 (regulating life and disability insurance).
xxxi N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-1 to -7 (1998).
xxxii N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2010) (regulating employment); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2002) (establishing a privacy right); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615
(McKinney 2006) (regulating health, life, long-term care, and disability insurances).
xxxiii N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215 (2013) (regulating health insurance); id. § 9528.1A (regulating employment).
xxxiv OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.65 (LexisNexis 2013) (regulating health insurance).
xxxv OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3614.1 (West 2013) (regulating health
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